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The Real Exchange Rate, Economic Development, and Structural Change:  
An Overview of Existing Literature 
 
Abstract 
This paper surveys the theoretical and empirical literature on the effects of the real exchange rate 
(RER) on international trade, economic development and growth.  We summarize the main 
conceptual issues, discuss the relevance of the RER as an instrument of development policy, 
provide an overview of the macroeconomic and microeconomic mechanisms that link the RER to 
trade and long run growth and development, analyze the challenges – especially the disconnect 
between theory and data -- that often arise in empirical applications, and present new avenues for 
future research.  In the process, we present some updated estimates and illustrative figures.  The 
mechanisms through which the RER influences long-run growth and structural change outcomes 
remains a promising area of research and the relevance of individual channels in different contexts 
deserves much more careful investigation.  Greater data availability should help fill some of these 
gaps in our understanding. 
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1. Introduction 
The real exchange rate (RER) is one of the most – if not the most -- important relative price at the 
macroeconomic level.  Studying the link between the level of the real exchange rate and longer-
term development issues had, however, fallen out of fashion for a few decades until a recent revival.  
The main aim of this paper is to provide a broad survey of this recent body of literature, reconcile 
it with the earlier research, and provide an overview of the issues and challenges involved. 
The two main channels through which the RER affects incomes, growth and development 
are the (short-run) Keynesian macroeconomic aggregate demand and trade channels and the (long-
run) development channel.  The first of these channels is also the most obvious one as the price of 
a country’s currency is a major factor determining its international competitiveness.  Although first 
formalized by David Hume, the emergence of research on this link between exchange rate 
movements and trade dates back earlier to the Mercantilists, and continues through to the Gold 
Standard and the ensuing Bretton Woods years, which were marked by debates centered around 
issues such as elasticity optimism/pessimism, the effect of secular trends in terms of trade on 
economic development, and the role of the exchange rate in maintaining internal and external 
balances. The second channel works through structural change caused by both demand and supply 
side factors in the form of employment and output shifts toward higher productivity and increasing 
return sectors, learning-by-doing, profitability, saving, and investment changes, information-related 
market failures, and other externalities.  While the role of exchange rate policy in affecting longer-
run development received some attention in the post WWII Bretton Woods years, consistent with 
the overall spirit of the era, most analysis was skeptical of the idea. Furthermore, contrary to more 
recent research, many policy makers promoted selective overvaluation, rather than undervaluation, 
in order to bring down the costs of imported inputs.  Thus, although the importance of the RER as 
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a development policy tool was recognized, its use was justified often on grounds other than 
competitiveness or export sector profitability. Moreover, empirical studies that were based on 
limited data from that period yielded conflicting results that were justifiably criticized in a classic 
paper by Orcutt (1950). 
Most macroeconomics and development literature during the trade and financial 
liberalization period of the 1980s also tended to ignore the role of exchange rate as a development 
policy tool.  In most growth literature, for example, the level of the RER is not of first order 
importance at all.3  This is in spite of the work on the East Asian development experience by 
scholars such as Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) who noted the importance of exchange rate 
policy for policy makers in South Korea and Taiwan, two of the Asian growth miracles.  The picture 
has changed, however, in recent years, and the role of the RER in influencing output growth and 
development is now at the center of much debate.  Subsequent studies, both theoretical and 
empirical, have mostly provided support for the use of RER undervaluation as an effective 
developmentalist policy with noticeable effects on both the level of economic activity and long run 
economic growth. The effect is also shown to be the opposite for RER overvaluations, which are 
found to slow down growth, particularly in developing countries.  This literature has also evolved 
over the years. While the earlier literature was mostly focused on aggregate country level analysis, 
more recent work has frequently involved firm and product level studies, highlighting the 
importance of the trading environment, productivity, product quality and variety, technology and 
skill intensity, and income levels of importers and exporters in shaping the effects of exchange rate. 
                                                 
3 In Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) the exchange rate appears only on three occasions, all related to growth regressions 
but not in any of the growth models or policy discussions. 
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This paper attempts to provide a broad survey of the literature on the RER as an instrument 
of development policy.  The focus is on long-run development issues. We discuss the conceptual 
issues, summarize major approaches taken to measuring the RER, explore the theoretical channels 
linking exchange rate policy to development, provide an overview of the empirical literature, and 
highlight some of the complications that arise when exposing theory to data. 
Several qualifications are in order.  First, we are concerned with the level and not the 
volatility or uncertainty of the RER. Second, we do not cover the large literature that attempts to 
address exchange rate determination or the pros and cons of different exchange rate regimes.  Third, 
given our focus on development, we ignore short-run fiscal and monetary policy issues. Fourth, due 
to space limitations we do not fully discuss the effects of methodological diversity on empirical 
analysis of the RER and development, including the estimation methods.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses whether the RER is a 
policy variable that can be managed. Section 3 summarizes RER measures used in the literature 
and their relative strengths and weaknesses.  Section 4 surveys the theoretical channels that link 
RER to growth, development, and structural change.  The penultimate section provides an overview 
of related empirical literature, presents some new estimates, and reports the relevant findings.  
Finally, the concluding section summarizes the lessons learnt and supplements the previous sections 
in suggesting avenues for future research. 
2. Is the Real Exchange Rate a Policy Variable? 
Before examining various effects of exchange rate movements on economic activity, we need to 
address the questions of whether the RER is actually a policy variable and, if so, to what extent 
policy can influence it in the desired direction. Traditionally the literature understated the role of 
policy in managing the exchange rate over extended periods of time, especially in the presence of 
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international capital mobility.  A body of research going back to Mussa (1986) shows, however, 
that the RER tracks the nominal exchange rate rather closely, which suggests that targeting the latter 
may effectively target the former as well, at least in the short- and medium-run.  This is not 
surprising in the presence of nominal rigidities. Policy can influence the path of the nominal 
exchange rate through fiscal or monetary policy.  The former acts by affecting both the volume and 
composition of aggregate expenditure, given that government spending is typically biased towards 
non-traded goods relative to private spending.  Monetary policy, on the other hand, is seen to act 
through three main channels; the portfolio channel, the signaling channel, and by altering the 
proportion of “chartists” versus “fundamentalists” in the foreign exchange market. 
Do policy makers actually make use of the instruments at hand to influence the RER?  Calvo 
and Reinhart (2002), coined the term “fear of floating” after showing that, in the aftermath of the 
Asian crises in 1997-98, developing countries have systematically intervened in the foreign 
exchange market to manage the behavior of exchange rates. Furthermore, Levy-Yeyati et al. (2013) 
convincingly show that sterilized interventions that aim to maintain competitive exchange rates or 
to avoid overvaluation do affect the RER in the short- and medium term. Given the RER behavior 
noted by Mussa (1986), this has implications for the influence of policy on RER. 
It may, of course, be easier to target a RER level under certain conditions compared to others 
(Kaldor, 1971).  As Frenkel and Rapetti (2014) point out, the key is that the constraint for sterilized 
interventions changes from foreign exchange reserves in the case of external deficits to domestically 
issued sterilization bonds in the case of surpluses.  The former constraint places an obvious finite 
limit as reserves cannot be negative.  However, in the latter case the constraint may often be milder 
and depends on the depth of domestic financial markets, the credibility of monetary institutions, the 
level of public debt, etc.  Insofar as an undervalued RER is associated with current account 
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surpluses, the open economy trilemma may be negotiable for longer in the latter case.  China, with 
its successful history of undervaluation and sterilized interventions provides an illustration. 
While it is not the main focus of this paper, one may also think about whether exchange rate 
policy is a substitute or a complement to other interventionist tools such as monetary, fiscal and 
trade policies (Kaldor, 1971; Guzman et al., 2018).  Fiscal expansion, for example, can help 
investment recover in times of aggregate demand shortage.  As discussed earlier, however, if the 
goal is to shift resources in favor of the tradable sector, then fiscal expansion may undermine this 
objective through both income and substitution effects. Moreover, the effect on the trade balance is 
also likely to be negative. Monetary policy generates its own tradeoffs. While sustained RER 
manipulation would require complementary monetary policies, the use of such policies alone could 
raise time inconsistency and inflation control issues that eventually undermine long-run growth.  
Why use RER rather than other available policy instruments? Real undervaluation works as 
an export subsidy and an import tariff. Given that trade liberalization since the 1980s and evolving 
WTO rules have narrowed the scope for direct trade interventions through tariffs, quotas and export 
subsidies, the RER can be used as an alternative to such interventions (Rodrik, 2008). An advantage 
of using policies such as tariffs or direct subsidies is that these directly affect the targeted sectors.  
This also acts as a disadvantage, however, once we consider the political economy dimension since 
the winners are smaller subsets within the economy.  RER policy, on the other hand, shifts relative 
prices in favor of the tradable sector as a whole, which helps ameliorate fissures and regulatory 
arbitrage between industries. It may not be feasible or desirable to tackle individual problems such 
as availability of electricity, transportation infrastructure, and corruption one at a time, and the RER 
can be used as an alternative mechanism to uniformly subsidize industrial sectors.  
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To encapsulate, even if one accepts the efficacy of the RER as an effective tool for structural 
change and growth, such a policy does not work in a vacuum, and has to be supplemented by the 
appropriate monetary, fiscal, and trade policies to address conflicting objectives (Kaldor, 1971; 
Rapetti, 2013; Guzman et al., 2018). 
3. Exchange Rate Measurement: Which Exchange Rate? 
The choice of the right exchange rate to use while analyzing international trade and development is 
not a straightforward one. Since we are interested in long-run development issues, one question is 
how to define the long-run RER? Another is how to empirically implement the conceptual 
definition? Yet another is what variables to use to estimate the long-run level and misalignment? In 
this section we briefly discuss various factors that determine the type of exchange rate that is chosen 
in the literature, beginning with a review of the conceptual issues and then turning to the even 
messier side of applied analysis with measurement challenges. 
3.1. Conceptual issues: Specialized vs dependent economy models  
The definition of the relevant RER depends, among other factors, on the structure of the economy, 
its size in international markets, and the structure of its trade.  The simplest and most widely used 
definition compares an aggregated measure of the price level of domestic goods to that of 
international goods.  Suppose that the home country and the rest of the world each produce one 
good that is tradable, and the two goods are imperfect substitutes. Additionally, both countries set 
prices in their domestic currencies and have infinite price elasticity of export supplies so that they 
can change exports in response to demand at given price levels. These are assumptions that most 
likely apply to large economies that produce differentiated goods and where the producers are 
operating at less than full capacity. Suppose also that producers set the same prices for their 
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respective goods (P and P*, respectively) in domestic and international markets.  Then, the external 
RER (RERext) is defined as follows: 
RERext = eP*/P                                     (1) 
where e is the nominal exchange rate (the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency).   
Sometimes, especially while analyzing primary commodity exporters or when 
implementing trade-related empirical exercises, the RER is defined as the terms of trade (RERtot).  
If PX and PM represent aggregate export and import prices, respectively, then we get: 
RERtot = ePX/PM                          (2) 
Economies in the real world produce and consume both tradable and non-tradable goods, 
and aggregate price indexes are weighted averages of the prices of both kinds of goods.  Consider 
a domestic economy and a foreign one, each producing a tradable good and a non-tradable one.  
Suppose α (α*) is the weight assigned to tradable goods while specifying an aggregate price index 
for the home (foreign) country. Then, using a Cobb-Douglas specification, we get the internal RER: 
RERint1 = e(P*T)α(P*N)1-α/( PT)α (PN)1-α           (3) 
In the “dependent economy” framework, it is typically assumed that the economy is a price 
taker in international markets (both because of the its economic size and the assumption that the 
goods it produces have close substitutes in international markets). The economy, therefore, faces 
perfectly elastic export demand and import supply curves, i.e., the international terms of trade are 
exogenously determined. Prices for goods that are not internationally tradable, on the other hand, 
are determined by domestic supply and demand. It is easy to show that, if the law of one price holds 
for traded goods, the indexes are identically constructed in the two countries, and the (exogenous) 
prices of goods in the rest of the world are normalized to unity, then equation (3) reduces to: 
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RERint2= PT / PN                              (4) 
Thus, the relevant RER, which induces substitution in consumption and production, is the 
relative price of traded goods in terms of the non-traded good, i.e., the internal RER: the underlying 
infinite price elasticities of export demand and import supply suggest a longer-run perspective and, 
given their economic size and structure, are particularly relevant for developing economies.  
Before we turn to measurement issues, let us briefly consider the small open economy 
assumption that motivates the dependent economy framework. 
3.2. Are developing countries price takers in international markets? 
With few exceptions, most countries are not large or specialized enough in most sectors to influence 
the world price of their exports (and especially) imports. To what extent can the typical country be 
treated as a price taker in international markets? The extent to which a country can be analyzed as 
a small open economy mainly depends on: (1) the degree of substitutability between its products 
and those of its trading partners, and (2) the market power that it has in different sectors.  One way 
to approach this question is to directly estimate the relevant elasticities at the aggregate level. The 
empirical evidence on price elasticities of export and import demand in developed countries 
generally suggests that they are sufficiently high for the Marshall-Lerner condition to be fulfilled.4  
However the estimates vary and, for reasons identified originally by Orcutt (1950), aggregate 
estimates of trade elasticities are likely to be biased downwards and misleading.  These problems 
are much better explored at the sectoral level, and thanks to wider data availability, it is now feasible 
to do so.  Before we review sectoral estimates, however, it would be useful to look at some of these 
data.  For example, given their nature, one would generally expect the degree of market power to 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Bussiere et al. (2020), who finds that the Marshall-Lerner condition is almost universally satisfied.   
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be greater for economically large countries and the degree of substitutability to be greater for 
homogeneous goods than for differentiated goods.  This suggests that it would be useful to look 
more closely at the relative composition of developing and developed country exports.    
The higher share of differentiated goods in international trade, and the presence of imperfect 
competition and product differentiation make the demand for industrialized country exports of 
manufactures less than perfectly elastic. However, the same is less true for developing countries. 
First, as we show below, a higher percentage of developing country exports are homogenous 
primary goods. Second, their exports of manufactures are mostly low skill and not differentiated. 
To illustrate this point and following Lall (2000), we classify the technology-and-skill-intensity of 
exports in five product categories: high-skill intensive manufactures (High-skill), medium-skill 
intensive manufactures (Medium-skill), low-skill intensive manufactures (Low-skill), natural-
resource-intensive manufactures (Resource), and primary products (Primary).5 Figures 1 and 2 
show that the median share of primary goods in total exports was 46% for low income countries, 
23% for middle income countries and 8% for high-income OECD countries in 2017. In contrast, 
the median share of high-skill manufactures was only 1% for low income, 2% for middle income 
and 10% for high income OECD countries in 2017. Figures 1 and 2 also show that differences in 
the export structures across these three groups of countries have been persistent across decades. 
Particularly, the share of primary goods is significantly higher among low- and middle-income 
countries than high-income countries. 
<Insert Figures 1-2 Here> 
                                                 
5 We provide details of product classification in the Appendix.  
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Another way to gauge the nature of international demand for products is to examine how 
closely substitutable a country’s exports are for exports from other countries.  By definition, 
differentiated products tend to have fewer substitutes than homogeneous goods. Figure 3 shows the 
median export shares of differentiated products (using the Rauch, 1999 conservative definition) 
within each income group and confirms the high level of heterogeneity in export structures between 
these country groups. In 2017, the median share of differentiated goods in high income OECD 
countries’ export baskets was 76% while the same number was 45% for middle-income and 26% 
for low-income countries.  
<Insert Figure 3 Here> 
Regarding econometric evidence, using the Rauch (1999) classification, Broda and 
Weinstein (2006) and Soderbery (2018) find that the average elasticities of substitution are much 
higher for commodities than for reference-priced goods, which in turn are higher than those for 
differentiated goods.   Likewise, Fontagne et. al. (2019) shows that trade volume responses to 
bilateral tariffs are larger for homogeneous than for differentiated products (using the Rauch, 1999 
classification). Finally, turning to market power, Soderbery (2018) derives inverse export supply 
elasticities for disaggregated trade flows and find that importing countries that are larger in terms 
of GDP, tend to have greater market power.  Moreover, their estimates yield supply elasticities for 
differentiated goods that are, on average, around three times larger than for homogeneous goods. 
3.3. The measurement of domestic and international prices 
The choice of price indexes to calculate RER is generally dictated by theoretical considerations and 
data availability.  If the objective is to capture international price competitiveness on the demand 
side, then the producer price index (PPI) and wholesale price index (WPI) often best capture 
tradable goods prices. Alternatively, unit labor costs in the tradable sector provide an informative 
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measure.  In a dependent economy framework, the ratio of tradable-nontradable good prices is often 
proxied by the ratio of PPI (or WPI) to CPI.  However, empirical work is often constrained by more 
limited data availability for PPI/WPI and unit labor cost series. Therefore, aggregate-level studies 
typically opt to use CPI to calculate the RER series. Using IFS (2019) data and based on the external 
RER in Eq. (1) (i.e., eP*/P), the data coverage drops from 8,576 for 189 countries with CPI-based 
RER (for 1950-2019) to 2,738 for 85 countries with the PPI-based RER (for 1950-2018).  
3.4. How to measure exchange rate misalignments? 
How to evaluate deviations from the “equilibrium” value of the RER and how to define this 
equilibrium?  An early answer came from Nurkse (1945) who defined the equilibrium exchange 
rate as one that maintains external and internal balance.6  The former, in turn, implies current 
account imbalances that can be financed by normal capital flows while the latter reflects full 
employment and equilibrium in the market for non-tradable goods.  Later work has introduced the 
related notion of “fundamental equilibrium exchange rate” (FEER) which is the level that is 
“expected to generate a current account surplus or deficit equal to the underlying capital flow over 
the cycle, given that the country is pursuing internal balance as best it can and not restricting trade 
for balance of payments reasons” (Williamson, 1985, p. 14).  Finally, there is the “behavioral 
equilibrium real exchange rate” (BEER) which introduces behavioral content that explains RER 
misalignment in terms of deviations of the actual exchange rate from its long-term equilibrium 
value. These values are derived from reduced form estimates based on a vector of medium- and 
short-run fundamentals such as real interest rate differentials, the terms of trade, productivity, and 
fiscal policy that cause short-run deviations from long-run trend values.  The emergence of models 
                                                 
6 For further discussion, see Krugman (1990). 
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with intertemporally optimizing representative agents has led to the extension of BEER models 
along this dimension. 
For our purposes, the most crucial distinction is between the short-run effects of RER 
changes on the macroeconomy and the long-run developmental effects of RER misalignment.  
Variables such as nominal wages, inflation, the stock of net foreign assets, or the capital stock that 
may reasonably be considered pre-determined in the short-run are usually treated as endogenous 
over longer periods. Longer-run estimates of misalignments, therefore, often control for the 
evolution of these variables. 
The simplest approach to incorporating long-run considerations -- one that involves rather 
light data requirements -- is to consider deviations from the Balassa-Samuelson adjusted RER. 
Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) suggested that, due to their higher relative productivity in 
the traded goods sector which translates into higher economy-wide wages, higher income countries 
tend to have higher aggregate prices. Thus, one usually estimates Eq. (5) below where Yit is the real 
GDP per capita of country i at time t, ln represents natural logarithms, and fi and ft are the country 
and time fixed effects.   
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖      (5) 
After running this regression, one can then calculate the RER undervaluation (i.e. 
misalignment) using the difference between the observed and predicted RER as follows: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖      (6) 
where ln𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the predicted value of lnRER from Eq. (5), and lnUndervaluation is the degree 
of misalignment: a positive value implies undervaluation. If averaged over 5-year or longer time 
periods, this approach should also minimize the influence of cyclical fluctuations.  
 14 
Alternatively, as one could employ a more macroeconomic approach (either FEER or 
BEER) and incorporate other slow-moving variables such as the NFA position, the current account 
balance, the international terms of trade, share of government consumption, the national saving rate, 
and relevant demographic factors.  Data availability becomes an issue here as many developing 
countries do not report high quality data at the desired frequency.   
How do commonly used RER measures match up when we use real world data? For 
comparison, we calculated the RER misalignment using 5 models: 1) the basic Balassa-Samuelson 
method, 2) Net foreign assets (divided by GDP, NFA) adjusted Balassa-Samuelson, 3) NFA and 
(log) terms of trade adjusted Balassa-Samuelson method, 4) NFA, (log) terms of trade and 
government consumption (divided by GDP) adjusted Balassa-Samuelson method, and 5) the panel 
cointegration method including (log) real GDP per capita and NFA.  
We present the RER misalignment for Japan and Mexico with respect to the US calculated 
by these five methods and using the PWT 9.1 with year and country fixed effects in Figures 4 and 
5. Notice that when we add more controls, the sample period drops from 1950-2017 to 1970-2015. 
However, the addition of these extra controls does not seem to make a big difference in the 
misalignment measure. As Table 1 shows, all five series for the full sample of countries are highly 
correlated (significant at 1% level) with each other, though less so for the 5th method 
(cointegration). 
<Insert Figures 4 & 5 Here> 
<Insert Table 1 Here> 
In estimating the misalignment measures, another issue is to decide on the relative price 
index specified on the left-hand side of Eq. (5). As mentioned earlier, the ratio of the PPI (or WPI) 
 15 
to the CPI may be appropriate for the internal RER but in practice, the relative CPIs are almost 
always used given their wider data availability. A second issue is to decide on the data source for 
the RER and national income data, which can influence the misalignment measurement 
significantly. Figure 6 shows the RER misalignment for Mexico using equation (5) from IFS (2019) 
and PWT 9.1. While the two series are highly correlated (0.96), they differ substantially in some 
sub-periods. We should also note that the exclusion of country fixed effects influences the 
misalignment measures significantly. The correlation between RER misalignment measures with 
and without country fixed effects is only 0.47 (using Eq. 5 and misalignment measure (1) with the 
PWT 9.1).  
<Insert Figure 6 Here> 
4. Exchange Rate and Development 
The exchange rate barely makes an appearance in the standard growth models. This is true for both 
mainstream and heterodox growth models, although for different reasons. In the former, it is mostly 
because of the dominance of the idea of monetary neutrality. A nominal variable such as the 
exchange rate should not be expected to affect real outcomes, especially in the long-run.  If policy 
can only influence the nominal but not the real exchange rate, then there is no reason to consider 
the exchange rate as relevant to long-run development policy.  Take, for example, the canonical 
Solow growth model or the family of endogenous growth models. Since there is no obvious 
association between the stocks of factors of production and the exchange rate, the latter is not a 
variable of interest in the determination of the steady state growth rate.7 Similarly, in non-
mainstream growth models, such as those belonging to the Post-Keynesian tradition, the exchange 
                                                 
7 Although it may affect the transitional dynamics through the savings channel.  
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rate has not typically played a major role because of a skepticism towards the role of relative price 
changes.  The Balance of Payments Constrained Growth (BPCG) model perhaps best illustrates this 
neglect.  In spite of the central role of open economy issues in this model, the RER is often ignored, 
in applied practice if not in theory, on the grounds that the level of the RER is not important 
(although often the rate of exchange rate change is incorporated).  
Over the years, however, a body of literature has emerged that analyzes the various 
theoretical mechanisms and channels through which the real and nominal exchange rate can 
influence the long-run trajectory of structural change and development.8  The rest of this section 
summarizes this literature.  It begins with an overview of the channels that link the RER to trade 
and demand growth in the short run, and then shifts the focus to longer-run issues. 
4.1. The short-run macroeconomic channels 
The trade effects of exchange rate changes were a subject of intense debate during the post WWII 
decades identified with import substitution policies.  In particular, whether undervaluation helps or 
hurts industrialization efforts was under scrutiny.  On the one hand, it was emphasized that 
overvalued RER could be used as an additional subsidy for industrial sectors by lowering the cost 
of imported intermediate and capital goods. On the other hand, it would impose a cost on exporters 
and import-competing industries by hurting international competitiveness. 
As we see below, underlying much of this debate was the so-called “elasticity pessimism” 
view that held that trade demand elasticities are much too small to have significant effects on trade 
volumes.  This debate has increasingly shifted in favor of the pro-undervaluation camp especially 
after the successes of the East Asian tigers under export-led development model as well as the 
                                                 
8 For a recent review of RER and industrial policy, see Bresser-Pereira and Rugitsky (2018).  
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failures in many cases of ISI programs in Latin America and the Middle East. International 
organizations such as the IMF also played a key role in this transition during stabilization programs 
as they frequently focused on exchange rate devaluations as a tool for expenditure switching 
policies to achieve current account balance. 
4.1.1. Income and substitution effects on trade values 
The most direct channel through which the RER affects the external balance is through the income 
and substitution effects.  As discussed earlier, the traditional approach to analyzing this linkage is 
the classic Marshall-Lerner condition, which assumes infinite elasticities of export and import 
supply.9    In its simplest form, assuming initially balanced trade, the sum of export and import 
demand elasticities should be greater than one for a devaluation to improve the trade balance.  
More recent models of trade behavior take into account the degree of exchange rate pass 
through, pricing to market, supply bottlenecks, and related issues.  Production in many developing 
countries, for instance, relies largely on imported intermediate inputs, which do not have 
domestically produced substitutes.  This will negate some of the effect of exchange rate movements 
on trade volumes. Furthermore, micro level empirical studies suggest that higher productivity firms, 
and firms within global supply chains have a higher share of imported inputs that are of higher 
quality and cost more (Kugler and Verhoogen, 2009; Manova and Zhang, 2012). Real depreciation 
will increase the cost of imported inputs for these higher-end firms, and thus dampen the 
reallocation of resources from nontraded to traded good sectors, or from traded primary to 
manufacturing sectors.  This effect is mitigated, however, if it is the large importing firms are the 
ones that happen also to be the large exporting firms.  Blaum (2017), for example, finds that large 
                                                 
9 One can relax these assumptions by generalizing to the Marshall-Lerner-Robinson-Bickerdike condition. 
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devaluations are characterized by increased aggregate shares of imported inputs in total input 
spending, and that these facts are explained by the expansion of exporters, who are intensive 
importers (see also Amiti et al., 2014). Similarly, if the exchange rate pass-through into the foreign 
currency export price is low, perhaps because the economy is small in its export markets, the 
immediate effect of nominal exchange rate movements on the volume of exports will be weak, 
limiting the effect on trade balance (measured in foreign currency terms). 
As mentioned earlier, for reasons that have to do with the composition of their exports 
(mainly primary commodities and agricultural products) and imports (non-substitutable 
intermediate inputs and capital goods), and the limited supply elasticities, there was considerable 
skepticism in the early post-WWII decades that the Marshall-Lerner condition was satisfied for 
most developing economies.  It is now a widely recognized finding in empirical trade literature that 
estimates of aggregate trade elasticities are smaller, on average, than the corresponding 
microeconomic estimates at the industry/sector level. Although initially explored by Orcutt (1950), 
recent explanations have re-focused on the “heterogeneity bias.” The output of sectors that have 
low price demand elasticities are likely to get greater weight (due to their greater price volatility) 
while estimating aggregate elasticities.  Why would one expect price changes to be larger for 
inelastic products?  Imbs and Mejean (2015) cite two major reasons: (1) firms facing elastic demand 
under imperfect competition will opt to vary their mark-ups to limit the price response to cost 
shocks, and (2) for economic reasons, policy makers tend to target inelastic products for tariffs.  
They also find that, based on US data, the sectoral data imply elasticities that are more than 3 times 
those derived from aggregated data. 
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4.1.2. The absorption approach and effects through the composition of absorption 
Based on national income accounting, the current account is the mirror image of the gap between 
national income and expenditures (absorption).  In many developing countries devaluation may 
result in a short-run contraction in the level of spending and economic activity through several 
channels, some of which we now discuss (see Krugman and Taylor (1978) for a formal treatment). 
(1) Redistribution within the private sector (the “Diaz-Alejandro effect”): Given that domestic 
prices are a weighted average of domestic and imported good prices, devaluation increases domestic 
price levels and, assuming nominal wage rigidity, causes a reduction in real wages and 
redistribution in favor of owners of capital.  Assuming that workers have a higher marginal 
propensity to consume than capitalists, decreasing real wages will lead to lower private spending, 
thus contracting domestic demand and output.  
(2) Fiscal effects:  If the country is a price taker in export markets so that the volume of exports is 
independent of the exchange rate, the value of exports in foreign currency becomes independent of 
the exchange rate. In that case, the real value of taxes paid by exporters (measured in domestic 
output units) increases after a devaluation and therefore reduces private disposable income and 
spending. The underlying assumption here is that the marginal propensity to consume for the public 
sector is near zero in the short run.  
(3) Valuation effects: Returning to the Marshall-Lerner set-up, suppose a country has an initial trade 
deficit.  The effect of a devaluation, in that case, will mechanically create a trade deficit, if we 
ignore all substitution effects and measure all quantities in terms of the domestic currency (because 
in this case the adverse valuation effect falls on imports, which are larger to begin with). The 
resulting decline in spending on domestic goods, again, has contractionary effects.  This is related 
to the broader “Hirschman effect.” Hirschman (1949), showed that, if we relax the assumption of 
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initially balanced trade, then the Marshall-Lerner condition is more likely to be satisfied, that is, the 
trade balance is more likely to improve following a devaluation if the economy devalues starting 
with a trade surplus and if all quantities are measured in domestic currency.  Conversely, if all 
quantities are measured in foreign currency terms, then a devaluation is more likely to improve the 
trade balance if the economy starts with an initial trade deficit. 
(4) The Laursen-Metzler effect: The standard Keynesian consumption function implies a declining 
average propensity to consume as income rises.  An implication, in the imperfect substitutes 
framework, is that RER depreciation that lowers the terms of trade and thus reduces income in 
terms of the foreign good, may raise aggregate spending in terms of the domestic good. This, in 
turn, affects the current account negatively.  
(5) Wealth effects: A nominal devaluation that increases domestic prices, reduces real money 
balances and real wealth. The resulting negative effects on domestic spending can cause the trade 
balance to improve even if devaluation leaves the terms of trade unchanged.  The emphasis on the 
absorption effects of a higher price level has been a highlight of the monetary approach to the 
balance of payments (see Frenkel and Johnson, 1976).  
To sum up, much of the short-run effects of exchange rate changes on output depend on the 
impact on the trade balance, either through trade values, or through the impact on domestic spending 
on domestic goods. The longer-run development-related analysis, where growth effects of 
investment, technological progress, and structural change come into play, is what we explore next. 
4.2. The development channel 
This section focuses on the effect of the RER on longer-run development, structural change and 
economic growth, and examines what Frenkel and Ros (2006) called, the “development channel.”  
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The development process involves economic changes at both the micro and macro levels, and 
greater data availability over time has meant that analysis can be more fine-grained than in the past. 
As in the previous sub-section, we begin with a brief overview before discussing specific channels 
identified by the literature as potentially important for the development-RER nexus. 
The earlier development literature did not view the RER as a viable industrial policy tool 
for structural change.10 There has, however, been a resurgence in recent years of interest in the role 
of the RER as an instrument for development and the utility of, in the words of Amsden (1989), 
getting prices “wrong” (see Bresser-Pereira and Rugitsky (2018) for a review of these debates).  
This has followed the successful East Asian experience and is in contrast to the Washington 
Consensus that influenced policy worldwide over much of the post-1980s debt crisis period, and 
saw RER issue as mostly one of avoiding misalignment (both under and over valuation) and getting 
the (relative) prices to be consistent with their equilibrium values, howsoever defined.  While there 
is still ongoing debate over the concept of equilibrium exchange rates and the mechanisms through 
which the RER can influence structural change and development, the bulk of recent work has found 
a positive relation between the degree of RER undervaluation, growth, investment, and economic 
diversification, especially in developing economies (Hausmann et al., 2005; Gala, 2008; Rodrik, 
2005, 2008; Freund and Pierola, 2012; Razmi et. al., 2012; Rapetti et al., 2012; Di Nino et al., 2011; 
Levi-Yeyati et al., 2013; Missio et al., 2015; Guzman et al., 2018). This is not to say however that 
                                                 
10 There were, of course, exceptions. Kaldor (1971), for example, already emphasized the importance of exchange rate 
for manufacturing industries, which enjoy increasing returns: “The task of maintaining competitiveness through the 
choice of a favorable exchange rate is therefore of the highest importance to an industrial country from the point of 
view of its long-run growth potential and not only on account of its short- or medium-term effect on the level of 
employment” (Kaldor, 1971: 8). 
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the strength or even the direction of the development channel is independent of country and product 
characteristics.  Next, we review the main channels through which the RER is expected to affect 
long run development and growth. 
4.2.1. The profitability channel and reallocation of resources 
Changes in the RER affect the relative profitability of the tradable sector.  Assume for simplicity 
that the tradable sector is a price taker, at least in the long run, in the international markets.  It is 
relatively straightforward to show that, under a broad range of plausible assumptions including any 
degree of nominal wage rigidity, a real devaluation reduces the product wage and increases the 
relative profitability of the tradable sector.  This, in turn, would help the tradable sector expand over 
time as a result of investment and resource reallocation, including the development of infant 
industries.  If there is something special about this sector, such as higher average productivity, the 
ability to expand without driving down prices (to the extent that these are internationally 
determined), the larger scope for learning-by-doing, more opportunities for technological 
innovation, or greater presence of (internal and external) economies of scale, then such resource 
reallocation places the economy on a higher growth trajectory. This is the classical development 
channel as structural change through industrialization and relocation of resources towards tradable 
goods with higher technology-and-skills content and increasing returns has been recognized as the 
main pathway to climb up the production ladder (Prebisch, 1950; Kaldor, 1966, 1971; Balassa, 
1971). If RER policy can help reallocate resources towards sectors with learning spillovers and 
external economies, it is likely to be welfare improving (Ros, 2015, Ch.3; Guzman et al., 2018). 
The link from real undervaluation to profitability and sustained development can work 
through different mechanisms.  Before we turn to these mechanisms, an important caveat is in order.  
This has to do with the presence of comparative advantage and relative resource costs. Many 
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developing countries mainly export primary commodities and are price takers in these markets (see 
Figures 1-3).  Increased profitability in these sectors may actually encourage specialization in 
commodities, leading to ‘premature’ deindustrialization and a re-primarization, with destructive 
effects on long run capital accumulation and growth, a process Ros (2013) called “Prebisch’s 
nightmare.”11 Prebisch (1959), Ros (2013) and Guzman et. al. (2018) discuss this issue in detail 
and suggest that, if the idea is to boost diversification in the manufacturing sector, and not expansion 
of the tradable sector per se, then an undervaluation may have to be accompanied by a tax on 
commodities.  This, in effect, creates a multiple RER regime through which policy makers can 
subsidize manufacturing firms. 
The tension between non-produced natural resource endowments and the perceived 
desirability of industrialization is an important consideration that was addressed somewhat 
differently during the import substitution era.  Rodrik (1986), for example, offers a theoretical 
model whereby disequilibrium exchange rates, both under and overvalued, can raise welfare by 
promoting structural change and industrial growth. Accordingly, changes in internal terms of trade 
in favor of industry is seen as the main development channel for structural change. In the presence 
of an inward oriented industrial sector and an export oriented agricultural sector, which was the 
typical duality in most developing countries at that time, the exchange rate serves as a double-edged 
sword: an overvalued currency imposes a tax on export-oriented agricultural sector but works as a 
                                                 
11 Premature deindustrialization refers to declining share of industrial value added, investment and employment in a 
country before it becomes developed. Re-primarization refers to the specific case of semi-industrialized countries such 
as those in Latin America that experience a return to a primary good based specialization. For a discussion, see 
McMillan and Rodrik (2011), Ros (2013), Dahi and Demir (2016, ch.5).  
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subsidy for the domestic industrial sector by lowering cost of imported inputs, both intermediate 
and capital. The net effect could be a transfer of resources from agriculture to industry.  
With growing trade and internal liberalization, developing economies are now much more 
influenced by international markets.  This has led to theoretical models that treat traded goods prices 
as determined in international markets. The implications turn out to be quite different. Ros and 
Skott (1998), for example, build a two-sector model with a modern traded goods sector (utilizing 
capital and operating under increasing returns to scale) and a non-tradable sector, and examine the 
effects of RER on capital accumulation. In this setting, RER overvaluation causes a profit squeeze 
in the modern sector and leads to a lower capital stock equilibrium. Conversely, for a low-income 
economy, RER undervaluation can lead to a self-sustaining trajectory towards the higher capital 
stock equilibrium.  
Rodrik (2008) posits that the tradable sector in developing economies is characterized by 
market failures and institutional weaknesses to a greater extent, which means that the tradable sector 
is below its optimal size, and this creates room for policy to remove the distortion. He shows, in an 
endogenous growth framework, that undervaluation helps address this issue by expanding the 
tradable sector. Likewise, Razmi et. al. (2012) emphasize productivity increases based on shifting 
of resources (including Lewisian surplus labor) from traditional to modern/industrial sectors. If the 
tradable sector is the modern/capital-intensive/high productivity one, then raising the profit rate 
through a devaluation boosts aggregate employment and productivity.  
The presence of Arrow-type learning effects and related externalities makes intuitive sense 
for the manufacturing sector in developing economies.  Rapetti (2013) posits the presence of 
external economies of scale to focus on the possible tradeoffs between domestic short-run demand 
management and longer-run growth.  Consider a policy maker who attempts to internalize learning 
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externalities by boosting profitability in the modern tradable sector through nominal 
undervaluation.  If this translates into real undervaluation on impact, one would expect non-tradable 
price inflation, due both to substitution effects and because of upward wage pressure.  This causes 
a “horse race” between rising productivity (due to investment and increasing returns) and wages.  
Rapetti (2013) analyzes the conditions under which multiple equilibria arise, and aggregate demand 
policies can help policy makers move the economy to the high capital stock equilibrium over time.   
A parallel strand of research comes from the “new” new trade theory” with a focus on firm-
level responses to RER movements.  Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), Berman et al. (2012) and Martin 
and Rodriguez (2004), for example, find that high-productivity exporters with lower demand 
elasticities respond to a RER depreciation by increasing their mark-ups rather than export volumes. 
Likewise, Chatterjee et al. (2013) show that, in response to a RER depreciation, high-productivity 
firms increase their product range and core product prices. This will effectively dampen the 
Keynesian macroeconomic channel. The findings from these studies suggest that firm heterogeneity 
determines how firms react to a positive profitability boost after a RER 
undervaluation/depreciation. High-productivity firms increase their mark-ups and range of products 
rather than export volumes. This boost to profits, in turn, is expected to increase capital 
accumulation in the long run. Low-productivity firms, however, will respond by having higher entry 
rates and export volumes as previously unprofitable firms will now be able to enter the export 
market.  Another related body of literature, argues that the negative profitability effect of RER 
overvaluation has a positive effect on traded good sector productivity by increasing competitive 
pressures. Ekholm et al. (2012), for example, finds that RER appreciation affected Norwegian 
manufacturing firms through export sales, imported inputs and import competition in the domestic 
market with a net gain in labor productivity and TFP for exporting firms.   
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Finally, one should note that the profitability channel is related to the Dutch disease and 
natural resource curse issues. An exogenous shock such as natural resource discovery, a large terms 
of trade shock favoring primary goods, or a surge in capital inflows can affect the RER. The 
research on Dutch disease essentially underlines the concern that RER overvaluation can cause a 
profitability squeeze in the non-primary traded goods sectors and lead to deindustrialization, with 
a decreasing share of non-primary traded goods in total value added and employment (Ros, 2015, 
ch.4; Guzman et al., 2018).12  The mechanism is typically seen to work through two channels: (1) 
the spending effect: an exogenous shock that boosts the purchasing power of spenders through 
income and wealth effects generates excess demand in the goods market, leading to real 
appreciation, (2) the resource effect: the movement of labor, capital, and other resources towards 
the expanding commodity sector at the expense of other sectors in the economy.  The first effect 
tends to expand the non-tradable sector while the second tends to contract it. The cases of Latin 
America and sub-Saharan Africa during the 2000s highlight the deindustrializating effects of 
overvaluations in the aftermath of a positive terms of trade shock (Ros, 2013). 
4.2.2. Higher savings and investment 
As discussed in section 4.1.2, this aspect of RER undervaluation/depreciation was first highlighted 
by Diaz Alejandro (1965). He, however, emphasized the short-run contractionary impact of the 
redistribution from low-propensity to save workers’ wages to profits. In contrast, Kaldor (1971) 
emphasized the positive effects of competitive exchange rates through exports growth on 
manufacturing sector investment and productivity with significant long run growth effects. Levi-
Yeyati et. al. (2013) relate RER to the balance sheet channel and longer-run growth.  Accordingly, 
                                                 
12 See Harding and Venables (2016) for a comprehensive survey. 
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if higher savings enable financially constrained tradable goods firms to invest more through larger 
supply of internal funds and/or through lower cost of capital and greater credit availability, then 
devaluations could be expansionary over the long run. Razmi, et. al., (2012) also highlight the 
impact of undervaluation and higher profitability on investment in a Keynesian framework with an 
independent investment function.  Conversely, a body of literature that developed following the 
Asian crisis of 1997-98, identified the negative balance sheet effects on investment and output (see 
Krugman, 1999 and Frankel, 2005). With a substantial proportion of their liabilities denominated 
in foreign currency, developing country firms can find themselves insolvent following large 
depreciations.  This can then negatively affect investment, exporting activity, R&D, output and long 
run growth (Cespedes et al., 2014; Serena and Sousa, 2017).   
4.2.3. Structural diversification and product composition of trade 
The process of industrialization appears to involve diversification in its early and middle stages (see 
Imbs and Wacziarg, 2003 for economic structure and Cadot et. al., 2011 for export structure).  In 
cases where learning externalities increase private costs, RER policy can help countries acquire 
new sectors, which previously they did not have a comparative advantage in, and maintain them 
permanently.  Krugman (1987) highlights this argument in a Ricardian framework with a continuum 
of goods and shows how a temporary real devaluation can help achieve permanent diversification.  
Razmi (2013) advances a similar argument in a model with surplus labor. 
4.2.4. Balance of payments-related constraints on growth 
Perhaps the most obvious linkage between the RER and growth goes through the balance of 
payments.  The growth process for developing countries typically involves acceleration of capital 
goods and intermediate input imports.  This high income-elasticity of imports can result in foreign 
exchange shortages and, in the presence of managed (flexible) exchange rates, pressure on reserves, 
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culminating in many cases in balance of payments crises and stabilization programs.  While this 
link was recognized in early post-WWII literature (see, for example, the two gap models developed 
starting with Chenery and Bruno, 1962), the Post Keynesian BPCG model (Thirlwall, 1979) has 
zoomed in on this point.  This framework, however, assumes infinite supply elasticities of export 
and import, which is unlikely to be a plausible assumption for most products exported by 
developing countries.  Moreover, relative prices matter, by construction, only in terms of rates of 
change and not levels. This is in tension with the presence of learning externalities, resource 
reallocation, capacity growth, and other long-run development considerations which may enable a 
country to export increasing volumes at a given international relative price (see Razmi, 2015 for a 
critique of the BPCG model). The balance of payments constraint itself, however, remains 
important as the Latin American debt crises of the 1980s, the Mexican crisis of 1994, and the Asian 
crises of 1997-98 were all preceded by overvalued RERs. 
4.2.5. North vs. South asymmetries 
Differences in the pattern of specialization and the composition of trade are likely to condition the 
effects of RER undervaluation across countries. Systematic differences in price elasticity of 
demand, in particular, mean that RER changes are likely to have smaller effects in the short- to 
medium-run on the volumes of higher-skill, more sophisticated and newer technology goods such 
as those exported by the North than the lower-skill intensive and less heterogeneous goods exported 
by the South. Based on Vernon (1966), it is also likely that price elasticities are lower in the early 
stages of a product’s life cycle for new and technology intensive goods, which are mostly invented 
and produced in the North.  Furthermore, Northern producers enjoy higher mark-up rates than 
Southern ones given their higher average productivity levels. Due to the presence of large reservoirs 
of underemployed labor, the profitability effect of RER undervaluation is likely to be higher in 
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Southern countries.  Southern countries also suffer from a variety of market and government failures 
as well as structural constraints on their economic policies, which can make RER an easy second-
best policy tool to support traded goods sectors and industrialization. This may explain why RER 
undervaluation is found to have a significantly positive effect on growth and investment only among 
the developing country samples.  Caglayan et al. (2013) and Caglayan and Demir (2019) also 
provide evidence showing how countries’ development levels and the technological composition 
of their exports shape the effect of RER depreciation on exports. It is important to keep in mind, 
however, that many primary good exporters may be less likely to benefit through the development 
channel from RER undervaluation as they face supply side rigidities. 
5. Empirical Issues 
The empirical work on the Keynesian trade channel is rich, examining various effects of exchange 
rate movements on trade flows, both at the macro and micro levels, and both aggregate and 
disaggregate levels. Given the availability of a large number of papers on the trade-RER 
relationship, we will focus mostly on the empirical studies of the development channel. As 
discussed earlier, there has been a renewed attention on the role of exchange rate in long term 
growth and structural change in recent years. However, most of these studies focus on the effects 
of exchange rates on growth without identifying the channels through which the development effect 
materializes. The empirical methodologies and estimation methods are also quite mixed. First, 
whether the observed growth effects are driven by a reallocation of resources towards increasing 
return activities, increasing savings, higher investment, or some other channel needs to be explored 
more carefully. Reallocation of resources towards different tradable sectors may not have the same 
development effects. High skill manufactures, for example, are quite different from low skill ones. 
A competitive RER will benefit all tradable sectors, including those in agriculture and natural 
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resources. Thus, rather than encouraging reallocation towards increasing return industries and 
enabling diversification, a competitive RER could lead to primarization and specialization in 
traditional and resource-intensive low return activities. Second, as pointed out by Henry and 
Woodford (2008), there is the question of how to and for how long to maintain RER undervaluation 
for it to be growth enhancing. Third, the relationship between RER and growth is a two way one 
and studying it requires appropriate estimation methodologies as correlation does not imply 
causality. Fourth, the definition of undervaluation is not straightforward and it is hard to get a 
consensus on how to estimate the equilibrium RER. Fifth, the cutoff point for developed vs. 
developing country incomes is not an obvious one. As highlighted by Henry and Woodford (2008), 
the reported positive effects of RER undervaluation on growth are sensitive to this cutoff point. We 
will now review each of these issues. Table 2 provides a selective review of empirical studies on 
the topic.  
<Insert Table 2 Here> 
5.1. Identification of the development channel 
As highlighted earlier, much of the literature on the development channel consists of aggregate 
studies without a clear identification of the relevant channels. Dollar (1992), Hausmann et al. 
(2005), Gala (2008), Levy-Yeyati et al. (2013), Prasad et al. (2007), Rodrik (2008), Berg and Miao 
(2010), Di Nino et al. (2011), Berg et al. (2012), Rapetti et. al. (2012), and Habib et al. (2017) find 
a significantly positive effect of RER undervaluation on growth but mostly in developing 
countries.13 Razin and Collins (1997) and Aguirre and Calderón (2005), on the other hand, find 
                                                 
13 For a review, see Williamson (2013), Eichengreen (2008), Ros (2015) and Guzman (2018). For the earlier literature, 
see Razin and Collins (1997). 
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asymmetric effects of RER misalignment on growth; moderate undervaluations are found to 
promote growth, while larger undervaluations or overvaluations undermine it. In the opposing 
camp, Schroder (2013) finds that RER misalignment, both under- and over-valuation, is harmful 
for growth in developing countries. Likewise, Nouira and Sekkat (2012) find no support for the 
positive effect of RER undervaluation on growth in developing countries and suggest that the 
previously reported positive effects are likely to be caused by other complementary policies rather 
than the RER itself.  
As for the channels, Prasad et al. (2007) find that RER appreciation causes a growth 
slowdown in exporting sectors as well as the manufacturing industries and their finding is consistent 
with Rodrik (2008) who shows that RER undervaluation increases the share of industry in GDP and 
total employment and reduces that of agriculture. Galindo et al. (2007), Einchengreen (2008), 
Demir (2010) and Caglayan and Demir (2014) also report that RER undervaluation/depreciation 
increases industrial employment while Demir (2013) reports insignificant effects on firm level 
industrial employment growth. As for sectoral unemployment, Frenkel and Ros (2006) finds a 
negative effect of RER appreciation on industrial unemployment in Latin America with a two-year 
lag.  Rodrik (2008) finds evidence that the positive growth effect of RER on growth is through a 
sectoral reallocation towards industry. In a similar token, Levy-Yeyati et al. (2013) shows that RER 
undervaluation increases growth through its positive effect on domestic savings and a redistribution 
from labor to capital, which is consistent with the insights of Diaz-Alejandro (1965) and Kaldor 
(1971). Likewise, Eichengreen (2008) finds that a higher and more stable RER favors tradable 
sector employment growth. McMillan and Rodrik (2011) also shows that RER undervaluation 
favors structural change in favor of modern tradables and encourages the flow of labor to high-
-productivity activities.  Other studies such as Rebelo and Vegh (1995) also find that RER 
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appreciation leads to reduction in manufacturing value-added. Regarding long run investment, 
Razmi et. al. (2012) and Libman et al. (2019) discover a positive and symmetric effect of lagged 
RER undervaluation on investment growth but mostly in the case of developing countries. 
Regarding productivity effects, Aghion et al. (2009), Caglayan and Demir (2014) find that RER 
depreciation increases labor productivity growth while Fuentes et al. (2006) and McLeod and 
Mileva (2011) reports similar effects for the case of TFP growth. Furthermore, Aghion et al. (2009) 
also shows that the negative effect of RER overvaluation is mostly limited to countries with low 
financial development.  
As discussed earlier, RER can affect long run growth through changes in trade structure as 
well. This is the export-led growth channel, which is often confused with the short-run export-
growth channel. Colacelli (2010) discovers that most trade responses to RER at the country level 
come from the extensive margin by increasing the variety of exported goods as new exporters enter, 
and more so for more sophisticated products. These effects of RER are also found to be stronger 
among high-income exporters, partly thanks to better credit availability. Colacelli’s results suggest 
that a minimum level of development may be required for the development channel to operate.  
Freund and Pierola (2012) argue that RER depreciation in developing (but not in developed) 
countries stimulates a reallocation of resources towards exportables and facilitates entry into new 
export products and markets while enabling sustained manufacturing export surges. Cimoli et al. 
(2013) also reports that RER undervaluation favors export diversification which, in turn, is 
associated with an upgrading in the technological intensity of exports and higher economic growth. 
Di Nino et al. (2011) find that RER undervaluation helps increase exports of industrial goods more 
than primary goods, and also increase export variety. Goya (2018) confirms these findings and 
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shows that depreciated and stable RER encourages wider export variety, particularly in goods with 
higher technological intensity.  
Using 28 individual country panels, Caglayan et al. (2013) studies the effects of RER in first 
and second moments on bilateral South-North and South-South bilateral manufactured goods 
exports. The empirical results, however, are inconclusive, highlighting the importance of country 
and trading partner heterogeneity. In a follow up study, Caglayan and Demir (2019) examine the 
effects of bilateral real exchange rate changes (both in first and second moments) on trade structure 
by disaggregating exports based on their technology and skill content. Their findings suggest that 
RER depreciations have a positive and significant effect only on exports of medium and low-skill 
and resource-intensive manufactures but not on high-skill manufactures or primary goods. They 
show that the positive effect of RER depreciation is conditional on both the direction and the 
product composition of trade. For example, for high skill goods, RER has a positive effect only for 
exports of South to North but not in any other direction. Likewise, for primary goods, only Northern 
exports to South respond positively to RER depreciation.  
Some recent studies of the link between RER changes and export diversification and 
structural change have focused on firm-level effects.  Iacovone and Javorcik (2008), for example, 
find that export diversification is preceded by a rise in firm investment and that export discoveries 
are more frequent in the immediate period after devaluations.  Highlighting firm heterogeneity, 
Caglayan and Demir (2014) show that RER appreciation hurts productivity of inward oriented 
firms’ while benefiting export-oriented firms.  Regional heterogeneity may also be important as 
Alfaro and Cunat (2019) find that firms in export-oriented emerging Asia are more likely to engage 
in R&D and experience productivity growth following depreciations compared to firms in Latin 
American and Eastern European countries.  
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As an exploratory exercise, we replicate the growth regression of Rodrik (2008) using Eq. 
(7) where we test the effect of RER undervaluation on real GDP per capita growth. 
𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝑙𝑙ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐺𝐺𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (7) 
where Growth represents 5-year (geometric) average growth rates of real GDP per capita (output-
side real GDP per capita at chained PPP's in mil 2011 US$) using PWT 9.1 data, RGDPPCit-1 is the 
lagged level of real GDP per capita, Undervalit is the five-year average of annual RER 
undervaluation based on Eq. 6 , fi and ft are country and year fixed effects, and εit is the error term. 
Figure 7 shows the distribution of the annual undervaluation measure with a mean of -0.182 and a 
standard deviation of 0.665. All variables are averaged over 5-year periods between 1950-1954 and 
2015-2015, yielding 14 time periods (we exclude growth rates for 2015-2017 for not having full 
five-year observations).14 
<Insert Figures 1-2 Here> 
Columns (1)-(3) in Table 3 replicate Rodrik (2008) benchmark estimates and restrict the 
time period to 1950-2004, leaving out Iraq, North Korea and Laos.  Column (4)-(7) includes full 
sample period and all countries. In columns (2)-(3) and (6)-(8) we divide the sample into developed 
and developing using different cut-off points. Overall, we can qualitatively replicate Rodrik 
(2008)’s findings for GDP growth rates where the reported γ to be 0.017 for the full sample, 0.03 
for the developed and 0.026 for the developing country sample. The differences likely result from 
the use of different generations of the PWT (i.e. 6.2 in Rodrik (2008) vs. 9.1 here). The significant 
effect of RER undervaluation on growth for the full sample comes from the developing country 
group, independent of whether we use Rodrik’s sample (columns 2-3) or the full sample (columns 
                                                 
14 The (logarithmic) growth rates are calculated using five-year average incomes.  
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5-6). In fact, the effect is highly significant for developing countries, using the $6,000 real GDP per 
capita threshold, which is the World Bank cut-off point for high income countries in 1987. In 
column (7) we repeat the exercise for the full sample but using an average income cut-off of $6,000 
for the full time period. In column (8) we repeat the exercise using World Bank high income cut-
off for 2015.  The results are quite robust, suggesting a significantly positive effect of RER 
undervaluation on growth in developing but not in developed countries. 
5.2. Temporary vs persistent RER undervaluation 
The issues of how to maintain RER undervaluation and for how long are not well-addressed by the 
empirical research (Henry and Woodford, 2008). The answer to the first will depend on institutional 
capabilities, fiscal capacity, and other relevant policy choices such as exchange rate regimes and 
capital account openness (see Williamson, 2013 and Guzman et al., 2018 for further discussion). 
The second question of how long is also not well-discussed and empirical work on it is hard to find. 
The existing work on RER, investment, productivity, and growth shows some delayed effects from 
RER depreciation/undervaluation (see, for example, Eichengreen, 2008; Razmi et al., 2012, 
Caglayan and Demir, 2014) but does not fully address the question of how persistent RER 
undervaluation should be for it to be effective. 
5.3. Endogeneity, correlation and causality 
The endogeneity problem is a well-recognized challenge when estimating the effect of the RER on 
growth as it is relatively easy to show the overdetermined relationship between the two (Henry and 
Woodford, 2008; Nouira and Sekkat, 2012). Given the paucity of plausible instruments, most 
attempts to correct for endogeneity at the aggregate level rely on internal instruments (Gala, 2008; 
Rodrik, 2008; Aghion, 2009; Razmi et al., 2012; Schroder, 2013). A related issue is the difference 
between correlation vs. causality and the omitted variable bias whereby both economic growth and 
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RER undervaluation are driven by a third missing variable such as an activist industrial policy 
involving various macro and microeconomic interventions. The few studies that try to address these 
issues using methods other than GMM include Bussiere et al. (2015) who use a propensity score 
matching method and Habib et al. (2017) who use external IVs for identification. Another way the 
literature has tried to address the identification problem is by disaggregating the data and adopting 
firm, industry, product or destination-product level analysis whereby the RER can be taken as 
exogenous (Eichengreen, 2008; Demir, 2010, 2013; Ekholm et al., 2012; Caglayan et al., 2013; 
Martin and Mayneris, 2015; Chen and Juvenal, 2016; Caglayan and Demir, 2014, 2019; Alfaro et 
al., 2018; Serena and Sousa, 2017), or by including other control variables that are potentially 
endogenous (Rodrik, 2008; Aghion et al., 2009).  It should be noted, however, that the potential 
effects of endogeneity are likely to understate the effect of real undervaluation on growth. This is 
because growth, to the extent that it influences the RER, is likely to appreciate it (i.e., one would 
expect a negative correlation between the RER and growth). 
5.4. Is it really misaligned? 
As discussed earlier in Section 3, there is no consensus in the literature over what constitutes 
undervalued and therefore there is a proliferation of RER misalignment measures. As a result, 
Rodrik (2008) and Di Nino et al (2011), for example, experiments with various measures of RER, 
including PWT, IMF, CPI and WPI based measures, with and without the Balassa-Samuelson 
adjustment. Alternatively, Razin and Collins (1997) and Aguirre and Calderón (2005) adopt a 
fundamentals-based equilibrium RER. The lack of consensus over the identification of RER 
misalignment itself is a serious challenge for scholars and also policy makers.  
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5.5. Asymmetric effects 
The developmental effects of RER misalignment can be asymmetric so that undervaluations and 
overvaluations have heterogeneous effects. Furthermore, the degree of misalignment maybe more 
important than whether the RER is under or overvalued. While most studies assumed a symmetrical 
effect, a few including Razin and Collins (1997), Aguirre and Calderón (2005), Nouira and Sekkat 
(2012), Rapetti et. al., (2012), and Habib et al. (2017), among others, consider both nonlinearities 
and asymmetries in the RER effect. 
5.6. How to define developing countries? 
The reported positive effects of RER undervaluation on growth can be sensitive to the definition of 
the developing country sample. Moving the cutoff point from $6,000 to $8,000, for example, affects 
the results reported by Rodrik (2008) significantly (Henry and Woodford, 2008; Rapetti et al., 2012; 
Di Nino et al., 2013). Table 3 also shows the sensitivity of coefficient estimates to income cut-offs, 
time periods and the data source. Should one use the country classification based on income or 
development levels at the beginning (Habib et al., 2017), middle (Rodrik, 2008), the end, or the 
average of the sample period, and should one use a static or dynamic classification of developing 
countries are questions that need to be addressed as they affect the empirical results significantly 
(Rapetti et al., 2012).  
6. Concluding remarks 
While the main focus and the identification of transmission channels from the real exchange rate to 
development outcomes have changed over multiple waves, the interest in the issue has not died out. 
On the contrary, we have experienced a renewed and growing attention to the macro and micro 
effects of RER both at the aggregate and firm levels since the late 2000s. The earlier literature, 
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mostly during the Bretton Woods period focused on the Keynesian macro effects through the short-
run trade channel. More recent literature, since the 2000s, however, has increasingly focused on 
long-term development channels, with a variety of mechanisms analyzed whereby the RER affects 
long run growth and development. The theoretical literature offers a variety of demand and supply 
side mechanisms with sometimes positive and sometimes negative effects, conditional on the 
structure of the economy (including its level of development, factor endowments, etc.), the time 
horizon considered (short-run vs. long-run), the level of aggregation, and the complementary policy 
framework. At the macro level, the literature has evolved over time into a more nuanced perspective 
whereby the presence of dual economic structures and externalities result in multiple equilibria. At 
the more micro level, richer theoretical frameworks and databases have led to contributions that 
take firm and country heterogeneity seriously. The outcome has been an efflorescence of work at 
the intersection of development, growth, and international economics that highlights the diverse 
effects of RER on trade and structural change.  
In terms of empirical research, there is growing evidence highlighting the positive effects 
of undervalued RER on growth in developing countries but not in developed ones. However, this 
is not a strong consensus and there are skeptics. Similarly, the effects on trade flows appear to be 
conditional on trade structure as well as firm, industry and country characteristics. These findings 
have led to a renewed call for well-designed RER policies in developing countries to encourage 
structural change. However, there is no consensus on how to identify these industries and what kind 
of RER policies to be applied across different sectors. One of the key questions here is whether a 
single RER can achieve all the desired effects, and if not, what kind of complementary polices are 
helpful in different environments.  There is also strong agreement on the need to avoid RER 
overvaluations as the effects of over and under evaluations can be asymmetric.  Also, in the absence 
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of a widely agreed upon definition of RER misalignment, some of the results of empirical studies 
tend to be sensitive to the definition used as well as the source of the data employed. 
Designing appropriate RER-related policy is easier said than done, due to both internal and 
external constraints. Internal constraints include, among others, institutional capacity, time 
consistency issues, and distributional tradeoffs. On the external front, commodity price cycles, 
financial account liberalization, and commitments following from free trade agreements, bilateral 
investment treaties, and international organizations such as the IMF and the WTO make it difficult 
for countries to design policies to subsidize the tradable sector through RER policy.  There is much 
to be explored in this domain and the coming years promise to provide new insights into the various 
mechanisms that constrain or amplify the effects of persistent real exchange rate movements. 
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Figure 1: Median Share of Primary Goods in Total Exports 
 
 
 
Notes: The data shows the median share of primary good exports in total exports of a given country 
within each group. Primary good classification is based on Lall (2000) and income classifications 
are from World Bank (2020).  
Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity (2020) and Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 2: Median Share of High-Skill Goods in Total Exports 
 
 
Notes: The data shows the median share of high-skill exports in total exports of a given country 
within each group. High-skill good classification is based on Lall (2000) and income classifications 
are from World Bank (2020).   
Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity (2020) and Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 3: Median Levels of Differentiated Good Exports by Income Levels 
 
 
 
Notes: The data shows the median share of differentiated goods in total exports of a given country 
within each country group. The classification for differentiated goods is based on Rauch (1999)’s 
conservative definition and income classifications are from the World Bank (2020).   
Source: The Observatory of Economic Complexity (2020) and Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 4: RER Misalignment, Japanese Yen 
 
 
Notes: For Figures 4 and 5: The RER is calculated using the PWT 9.1 relative prices with pl_con 
(price level of CCON (PPP/xr), price level of USA GDPo in 2011=1). We took its inverse so that 
an increase in RER is a real depreciation. Therefore, an increase in the above figure is an 
undervaluation from the predicted equilibrium level of RER. Right axis is for misalignment 
measure 5.   
Source: Authors’ calculations.   
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Figure 5: RER Misalignment, Mexican Peso 
 
 
Notes: Refer to Figure 4 for variable definitions.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 6: Misalignment using Different Data Sources: IFS vs. PWT for Mexican peso 
 
  
 
Notes: RER using IFS data on CPI and World Bank data on real GDP per capita in constant 2010 
US$. The nominal exchange rate is with respect to the US dollar. RER from PWT 9.1 is based on 
the price level of CCON (PPP/xr) and output-side real GDP at chained PPP's (in mil 2011 US$).  
Source: Authors’ calculations.   
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Figure 7: Distribution of Undervaluation 
 
 
 
Notes: Numbers greater than zero indicate undervaluation as in Eq. 6.  
Source: Authors’ calculations based on PWT 9.1.  
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Table 1: Correlation Analysis of RER measures 
Method 1 2 3 4 5 
1 1     
2 0.999*** 1    
3 0.995*** 0.997*** 1   
4 0.994*** 0.995*** 0.997*** 1  
5 0.447*** 0.430*** 0.427*** 0.449*** 1 
 
Notes: Simple correlation coefficient among five misalignment measures using PWT 9.1 and for 
full sample between 1950-2017. 
 0 
Table 2: Review of Empirical Studies on RER and Development 
Study author 
and date 
Measure of 
exchange rate Data description Dependent variable 
Estimation 
method 
Effect of undervaluation/ 
depreciation 
Rodrik (2008) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P, 
Balassa-Samuelson 
corrected 
misalignment 
PWT 6.2, all 
countries 
5-year average 
GDP per capita 
growth & industrial 
output and 
employment shares 
FE and GMM 
Positive effects in developing 
countries. 
Rapetti et al., 
2012 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P, 
Balassa-Samuelson 
corrected 
misalignment 
PWT 6.2, all 
countries 
5-year average 
GDP per capita 
growth 
FE and GMM 
Positive effect in developing 
countries. 
Gala (2008) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P, 
Balassa-Samuelson 
corrected 
misalignment 
WB, developing 
countries 
Annual GDP per 
capita growth 
GMM 
Positive effect in developing 
countries. 
Razmi et al. 
(2012) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P, 
Balassa-Samuelson 
corrected 
misalignment 
PWT 6.2, all 
countries 
5-year average 
investment growth 
GMM 
Positive effect in developing 
countries. 
Aghion (2009) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P, 
Balassa-Samuelson 
corrected 
misalignment 
PWT 6.1, all 
countries 
Annual labor 
productivity growth 
GMM 
Positive effects in countries with 
low financial development. 
Eichengreen 
(2008) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P. 
UNIDO, 
emerging market 
countries 
Industrial value 
added and 
employment 
FE 
Positive effects. 
 1 
Galindo et al. 
(2007) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P. 
UNIDO, 9 Latin 
American 
countries 
Industrial 
employment 
GMM 
Positive effects when liability 
dollarization is low. 
Demir (2010) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P, 
and E. 
Manufacturing 
firm survey, 
Turkey 
Manufacturing 
employment 
growth 
FE and GMM 
Positive effects of RER, negative 
effect of its volatility. 
Caglayan et al. 
(2013) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P 
COMTRADE, 28 
Emerging markets 
Manufactured 
exports 
GMM Mixed effects depending on country, 
direction of trade and financial 
development. . 
Demir (2013) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P 
Manufacturing 
firm survey 
Turkey 
Manufacturing 
employment 
growth 
FE, GLS and 
GMM Insignificant effect of RER, negative 
effect of its volatility 
Caglayan and 
Demir (2014) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P 
Manufacturing 
firm survey, 
Turkey 
Labor productivity 
growth 
GMM Positive effects of RER (more so for 
inward oriented firms), negative 
effect of its volatility. 
Frenkel and 
Ros (2006) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P 
WDI, CEPAL, 
and PWT 6.1, 17 
Latin American 
and Caribbean 
countries Unemployment rate 
OLS 
Positive effect on employment. 
Razin and 
Collins (1997) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P, 
fundamentals 
corrected 
misalignment  
World Bank, 
developing 
countries 
Annual GDP per 
capita growth 
OLS, GMM, 
Cointegration 
Nonlinearities.  Moderate to high 
(but not very high) undervaluations 
associated with growth 
Aguirre and 
Calderon 
(2005) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P, 
fundamentals 
corrected 
misalignment IMF and WB 
5 and 10-year 
average GDP per 
capita growth 
GMM 
Positive effect of moderate 
undervaluation and negative effect 
of both overvaluations (increasing in 
size) and high undervaluations. 
Dollar (1992) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P, 
WB, developing 
countries 
Annual GDP per 
capita growth and 
Investment/GDP 
ratio 
OLS 
Negative effect of RER 
misalignment. 
 2 
Desai et al. 
(2008)  
 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P 
Bureau of 
Economic 
Analysis and 
Worldscope, firm 
level 
Firm level sales, 
assets, investment, 
profits, leverage. 
FE Positive effect on sales, assets, and 
investment of foreign firms and 
negative or no effect on domestic 
firms. Leverage increases for 
domestic but not foreign firms. 
Profits increase for both types of 
firms. 
Kearns and 
Patel (2016). 
Nominal effective 
exchange rate and 
debt-weighted 
exchange rate BIS 
Annual GDP 
growth, exports, 
imports, 
investment, public 
and private 
consumption. 
Univariate 
autoregressive 
distributed lag  
model  
 
Positive effects on growth through 
the trade channel and negative effect 
through the financial channel 
(supply and cost of foreign funding). 
The effects are stronger for 
emerging markets. Positive effects 
on investment, public and private 
consumption through the trade 
channel and negative effect through 
the financial channel. 
Di Nino et al. 
(2013) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P, 
Balassa-Samuelson 
corrected 
misalignment PWT 7.0 
5-year average 
GDP per capita 
growth (for panel), 
export growth 
(Italy) 
FE, GMM Positive effect on growth, stronger 
for developing countries. Positive 
effect on export growth and export 
values, especially for industrial than 
primary goods. Positive effects on 
extensive margins. 
Alfaro et al. 
(2018) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P. 
Orbis, World 
bank Firm 
Dynamics 
database, PWT 
8.0, firm level 
Firm level R&D, 
productivity, cash 
flow, export entry 
rate. 
Structural In export-oriented emerging Asia, 
real depreciations increase firm 
probability to engage in R&D, faster 
growth of productivity and cash-
flow and higher export entry rates. 
The effects are negative for firms in 
other emerging economies that are 
import dependent, and no significant 
average effects for firms in 
industrialized economies. Effects on 
physical TFP growth are non-linear 
and asymmetric. 
 
 3 
Berman et al. 
(2012) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P. 
France, IFS, 
French Customs, 
BRN, PWT 
Export volumes, 
export unit values, 
exporting 
probability 
FE Export unit values increase, 
especially for high productivity 
firms. Export volumes increase, less 
so for high productivity firms. 
Export probability increases. 
Chatterjee et 
al. (2013) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P. 
Brazilian 
Customs data, 
PWT. 
Core product 
prices, mark-ups, 
product scope, firm 
level. 
FE Increases core-product prices and 
mark-ups, more for more productive 
firms and firms with higher import 
costs. Increases product scope. 
Habib et al. 
(2017)  
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P, 
Balassa-Samuelson 
corrected 
misalignment PWT 7.1 
5-year average 
GDP per capita 
growth 
IV 
Positive effects, especially in 
developing countries. 
Nouira and 
Sekkat (2012) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P, 
fundamentals 
corrected 
misalignment 
WB, developing 
countries 
Annual and 5-year 
average GDP per 
capita growth 
FE, GMM, 
cointegration 
No robust effect. 
Libman, 
Montecino, 
Razmi (2019) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P, 
Balassa-Samuelson 
corrected 
misalignment PWT 9.0 Investment surges 
Probit 
Increases the likelihood of 
investment surges, especially in 
manufacturing based countries. 
Schroder 
(2013) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P, 
fundamentals 
corrected 
misalignment 
PWT 7.0, IMF, 
developing 
countries 
5-year average 
GDP per capita 
growth 
GMM 
Both under and overvaluations harm 
growth. 
Serena and 
Sousa (2017) 
Nominal exchange 
rate 
Firm level from 
developing 
countries,  
Firm level 
investment.  
FE-IV Positive effect when debt is in 
domestic currency but negative 
effect when the debt is in foreign 
currency. 
Freund and 
Pierola (2012) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P, 
PWT 6.3, 
COMTRADE 
Manufacturing 
export surges and 
FE Export surges in developing (but 
less so in developed) countries 
 4 
Balassa-Samuelson 
corrected 
misalignment 
new export 
products (5-year 
averages) 
preceded by large devaluations that 
lead to export growth and 
diversification. 
MacDonald 
and Viera 
(2010) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P, 
fundamentals 
corrected 
misalignment PWT 6.2 
5-year GDP per 
capita growth 
FE, RE, 
cointegration, 
GMM 
Positive effect on growth, especially 
for developing countries. 
Levi-Yeyati 
et. al. (2013) 
Specialized 
economy, EP*/P, 
Balassa-Samuelson 
corrected 
misalignment 
LYS dataset, 
PWT 6.3 
Annual and 3-year 
average GDP per 
capita growth 
FE-IV 
FX intervention and undervaluation 
positively associated with growth 
 
… 
 5 
Table 3: RER Undervaluation and Growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Rodrik  
1950-2004 
Developing 
1950-2004 
Developed 
1950-2004 
Full Sample 
1950-2014 
Developing 
1950-2014 
Developed  
1950-2014 
Developing 
Mean6k  
Developing 
12,475k  
lnRGDPPCt-1 -0.033*** -0.048*** -0.061*** -0.031*** -0.040*** -0.046*** -0.031*** -0.034*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
lnUndervalit 0.017*** 0.041*** -0.003 0.012** 0.029*** 0.001 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Observations 1,331 746 585 1,701 877 824 849 1,214 
R-squared 0.419 0.486 0.523 0.338 0.424 0.478 0.372 0.385 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Notes: ***, **, * refer to significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
